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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
For the reasons set forth hereinafter, Intervenor 
GARFIELD COUNTY respectfully submits that this Court lacks 
jurisdiction to decide this case. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Petitioner NATIONAL PARKS AND CONSERVATION ASSOCIATION 
filed an original "Petition for Review" in this Court, challeng-
ing an exchange of real property between Garfield County and 
respondent THE STATE OF UTAH. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Whether the exchange of real property between Garfield 
County and the State of Utah was proper, pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated Section 65-1-70. 
GOVERNING STATUTE 
Former Utah Code Annotated Section 65-1-70, in effect 
at all times material to this case, provided as follows, in 
pert inent part: 
In order to compact, as far as practicable, the land 
holdings of the State, the Division of State Lands is 
hereby authorized to exchange any of the land held by 
the State for other land of equal value within the 
State held by other proprietors; and upon request of 
the division, the governor is hereby authorized to 
execute and deliver the necessary patents to such other 
proprietors and receive therefrom proper deeds of the 
lands so exchanged; provided, that no exchange shall 
be made by the Division until a patent for the land so 
received in exchange shall have been issued to such 
proprietors of [or] their grantors. 
A copy of former Section 65-1-70 is included in the 
Addendum to this Brief. 
The 1988 State Legislature repealed Title 65 and 
enacted Title 65A, effective July 1, 1988. A comparable provi-
sion is now found at Utah Code Annotated Section 65A-7-7. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an original proceeding in this Court, brought 
by petitioner National Parks and Conservation Association (here-
after referred to as "NPCA"), under a "Petition for Review", 
challenging an exchange of real property between intervenor 
Garfield County (hereafter referred to as "Garfield County"), and 
respondents Board of State Lands and Patrick D. Spurgin, as 
Director, Division of State Lands and Forestry, State of Utah 
(hereafter referred to as "The State of Utah"), 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In April, 1987, Garfield County applied to the State of 
Utah to exchange certain real property owned by Garfield County 
near the Bryce Canyon Airport for a State school section located 
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within the boundaries of Capitol Reef National Park, through 
which the Boulder-to-Bullfrog County road, commonly referred to 
as the "Burr Trail", passes. (Administrative Record, hereafter 
referred to as "R.", pp. 5-7.) The State school section was 
appraised at $65,000.00 (R., pp. 8-24.) The County acreage near 
the Bryce Canyon Airport was appraised at $66,000.00. (R. pp. 
31, 44. ) 
On September 11, 1987, the Board of State Lands and 
Forestry approved the concept of the exchange, subject to further 
evaluation of the Countyfs offer to ensure that the value of the 
trust for the exchange would be better than equal value. (R., p. 
54.) On October 16, 1987, the Division of State Lands and 
Forestry conducted an analysis of the appraisals, and concluded 
that they accurately reflected the value of the lands in ques-
tion. (R., pp. 59-60. ) 
On November 3, 1987, the Division of State Lands and 
Forestry advised Garfield County that it would require from the 
County property with an appraised value of 150 % of the appraised 
value of the State school section, in order to complete the 
exchange. (R., pp. 72-73.) Garfield County then submitted two 
(2) County-owned lots in the Richfield City Industrial Park, with 
an appraised value of $33,500.00, thereby making a total exchange 
value of 151.5 % of the value of the State school section. On 
December 21, 1987, the Director of the Division of State Lands 
and Forestry approved the exchange. (R., p.89.) 
On December 24, 1987, after the requisite deeds from 
Garfield County had been executed, a Patent to the State school 
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section was executed by the Governor of the State of Utah and 
officially filed in the Office of the Lieutenant Governor of the 
State of Utah. On December 29, 1987, the Patent was recorded in 
the Office of the County Recorder of Garfield County. A certi-
fied copy of the recorded Patent is included in the Addendum to 
this Brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2-2 (3) (e) provides 
that this Court has "appellate jurisdiction" over "final orders 
and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings, originating 
with... the Board of State Lands." (Emphasis added.) Under 
Adkins v. Division of State Lands, 719 P. 2d 524 (Utah 1986), it 
is unclear whether Section 78-2-2 (3) (e) is actually intended to 
refer to the Board or the Division of State Lands. Regardless of 
that interpretation, however, because this case involves simply 
an exchange of real property between Garfield County and the 
State of Utah, as specifically authorized by Utah Code Annotated 
Section 65-1-70, there is no "final order or decree" from a 
formal adjudicative proceeding in either the Board or the Divi-
sion of State Lands for this Court to review in this case under 
its appellate jurisdiction. Furthermore, there is no statutory 
authorization for original, direct review in this Court of such 
an exchange. Therefore, this Court lacks both original and 
appellate jurisdiction in this case. 
2. This case is not ripe for adjudication, because 
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NPCA is not an aggrieved party, there has been no adverse impact 
on the subject real property, and there exists no justiciable 
controversy for this Court to decide. Baird v. State, 574 P. 2d 
713 (Utah 1978). 
Furthermore, NPCA lacks standing in this case. It has 
suffered no distinct and palpable injury whatsoever which could 
give it a personal stake in the outcome of the subject exchange. 
NPCA does not have greater interest in the exchange than does 
Garfield County, as the owner in fee simple absolute of the 
subject real property. This case does not present unique issues 
of great public importance. Consequently, NPCA has no standing 
before this Court. Terracor v. Utah Board of State Lands, 716 
P. 2d 796 (Utah 1986). 
3. The issue in this case is simply whether or not the 
State of Utah either acted outside of its authority, or in a 
manner so clearly outside reason that its action must be deemed 
capricious and arbitrary. Peatross v. Board of Commissioners of 
Salt Lake County, 555 P. 2d 281 (Utah 1976). On the 
administrative record before this Court, and in view of the 
express statutory authorization of Utah Code Annotated Section 
65-1-70, it is clear that the exchange is valid under Utah Law. 
4. A Patent to land is the highest form of title, and 
is immune from collateral attack. Ferry v. Street, 4 Utah 521, 11 
P. 571 (1886); appeal dismissed in Street v. Ferry, 119 U.S. 385 
(1886). NPCA has no legal basis which could possibly give rise 
to a cause of action for it to seek rescission of the Patent in 
this case. Consequently, the validity of the Patent to Garfield 
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County in this case should be upheld by this Court. 
5. Petitioner's brief relies, in large measure, upon 
materials which have been excluded by this Court in its denial of 
NPCA's Motion to Supplement Administrative Record. Therefore, 
those portions of the brief, and those issues which relate to 
matters which are not included in or supported by the administra-
tive record which is before the Court in this case, should be 
disregarded by this Court. Watkins v. Simonds, 14 Utah 2d 406, 
385 P. 2d 154 ( 1963). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION IN THIS CASE. 
On page 24 of its brief, petitioner simply declares 
that "NPCA is confident that this Court has jurisdiction over 
this action", and then attempts to justify that assertion with an 
Affidavit by Professor Boyce, which has been excluded from the 
record by this Court in its denial of petitioner^ Motion to 
Supplement Administrative Record. For the following reasons, 
this Court lacks jurisdiction in this case: 
It is evident that petitioner has misconstrued the 
governing statutes in this case. First, NPCA ignores the 
distinction between the Board of State Lands and the Division of 
State Lands, as clearly differentiated by this Court in Adkins v. 
Division of State Lands, 719 P. 2d 524 (Utah 1986). The Board of 
State Lands is vested with policy-making functions, as provided 
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by Utah Code Annotated Section 65A-1-2; while the Division of 
State Lands is the executive authority for the management of 
State lands, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 65A-1-4. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2-2 (3) (e), relied upon 
by petitioner, provides that this Court has appellate jurisdic-
tion over "final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative 
proceedings, originating with ... the Board of State Lands." 
(Emphasis added.) It is unclear, under Adkins, if that provision 
actually refers to the Board of State Lands, or the Division of 
State Lands. Regardless of the interpretation thereof, however, 
it is clear that there is no appellate jurisdiction for the Court 
to assert in this case, because there was no "final order or 
decree" in a "formal adjudicative proceeding" which originated in 
either the Board of State Lands, or the Division of State Lands, 
in this case. 
In Peatross vs. Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake 
County, 555 P. 2d 281 (Utah 1976) at 284, this Court defined 
"appellate jurisdiction" as follows: 
The standard rule is that appellate jurisdiction is the 
authority to review the actions or judgments of an 
inferior tribunal upon the record made in that tribu-
nal, and to affirm, modify or reverse such action or 
judgment. Correlated to this is the principle that 
ordinarily, where the lower tribunal, acting within the 
scope of its authority, has conducted a hearing and 
arrived at a decision, the reviewing court will examine 
only the certified record; and will not interfere with 
matters of discretion or upset the actions of the lower 
tribunal except upon a showing that the tribunal acted 
in excess of its authority or in a manner so clearly 
outside reason that its action must be deemed capri-
cious and arbitrary. (Emphasis added.) 555 P. 2d at 
284. 
In this case, there was neither a hearing held, nor a 
decision made. Instead, there was simply an exchange of real 
property between the State of Utah and Garfield County, as 
specifically authorized by former Utah Code Annotated Section 
65-1-70. Such action does not constitute any sort of formal 
adjudication which would rise to the level of a "final order or 
decree" in a case originating in the "Board" of State Lands, as 
required by Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2-2 (3) (e). 
Furthermore, as specifically interpreted by this Court 
in Adkins, supra, the former law, set forth in former Utah Code 
Annotated Section 65-1-9, only provided for judicial review of 
"orders" of the "board", in the district court. There was no 
provision for original, direct review in this Court. As of 
January 1, 1988, agency action is now governed by the new Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act (Chapter 46b, Title 63). Neither 
of those statutes applies in this case. 
Simply stated, therefore, this Court lacks both origi-
nal and appellate jurisdiction over this case. Because there is 
neither appellate nor original jurisdiction in this Court, nor is 
there a "final order or decree" for this Court to review, the 
"Petition for Review" should be dismissed, with prejudice. 
POINT II: PETITIONER LACKS STANDING IN THIS CASE. 
There exists a serious question as to the 
justiciability of the "Petition for Review" in this case, and as 
to whether or not the issues raised therein are ripe for judicial 
determination. As this Court observed in Redwood Gym v. Salt 
Lake County Commission, 624 P. 2d 1138 (Utah 1981) at 1148, "In 
order to constitute a justiciable controversy, a conflict over 
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the application of a legal provision must have sharpened into an 
actual or imminent clash of legal rights and obligations between 
the parties thereto. Where there exists no more than a differ-
ence of opinion regarding the hypothetical application of a piece 
of legislation to a situation in which the parties might, at some 
future time, find themselves, the question is unripe for adjudi-
cation." (Emphasis added.) 
In this case, the "Petition for Review" appears to be 
premised upon the notion that, by exchanging the subject real 
property with Garfield County, the State of Utah has somehow 
caused a "distinct and palpable injury" to petitioner. Implicit 
within that notion is NPCA's unfounded assumption that Garfield 
County will be somehow less capable of managing that property, 
and, therefore, that some automatic adverse impact upon petition-
er's abstract "recreational and aesthetic interests" may result 
at some future point in time. NPCA fails to recognize that, at 
the present time, the subject real property is in precisely the 
same condition as it was under the ownership of the State of 
Utah, prior to the exchange. No change whatsoever has been made 
by Garfield County to the land. For NPCA to assert that it has 
been "damaged", when all that has happened is that title to the 
land has been transferred from the State of Utah to Garfield 
County, is to engage in unwarranted speculation without any basis 
whatsoever in fact. There has been no act undertaken on the 
property which could possibly have any adverse impact upon any 
interest claimed to be promoted by petitioner. Consequently, the 
question is not ripe for adjudication by this Court, and there 
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exists no justiciable controversy in this case. Baird v. State, 
574 P. 2d 713 (Utah 1978). 
The present test for standing under Utah law is as 
follows: 
The Utah Supreme Court has established three tests to 
determine whether a litigant has standing. ... First, 
the litigant can show that he has suffered some dis-
tinct and palpable injury that gives him a personal 
stake in the outcome of the legal dispute. Seicond, the 
litigant may have standing if no one else has a greater 
interest in the outcome of the case and the issues are 
unlikely to be raised otherwise. Even if he is unable 
to meet the first two tests, under the third test, a 
litigant may nonetheless have standing if the issues 
are unique and of such great public importanc€> that 
they ought to be decided in the furtherance of the 
public interest. ... Blodgett v. Zions First National 
Bank, 752 P. 2d 901, 80 U.A.R. 5, 7 (Utah App. 1988). 
NPCA attempts to satisfy the "distinct and palpable 
injury" requirement under theories advanced in cases brought 
under federal environmental laws, by claiming that those cases 
demonstrate the type of injury sufficient to satisfy the standing 
requirements of Utah law. However, in addition to providing a basis 
for standing under the federal Administrative Procedures Act, the 
federal statutes also contain specific provisions which entitle 
interested parties to bring actions for enforcement thereunder. 
Furthermore, the federal courts have found a broad-based range of 
so-called "prudential" standing interests in environmental cases. 
This Court, however, has not adopted the same standards 
used by the federal courts for standing in federal environmental 
cases. In Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P. 2d 1145 (Utah 1983) at 
1148-49, this Court held that "It is generally insufficient for a 
plaintiff to assert only a general interest he shares in common 
with members of the public at large. ... We will not entertain 
generalized grievances that are more appropriately directed to 
the legislative and executive branches of government." Accord, 
Society of Professional Journalists v. Bullock, 743 P. 2d 1166 
(Utah 1987) at 1170. 
In Terracor v. Utah Board of State Lands, 716 P. 2d 796 
(Utah 1986), this Court thoroughly reviewed the doctrine of 
standing under Utah law, and concluded that Terracor did not have 
standing to challenge certain procedures used by the Board of 
State Lands in leasing a parcel of real property to its competi-
tor. In Society of Professional Journalists, supra, this Court 
explained its reasoning in the Terracor decision, as follows: 
The only Utah writ case to come to our attention in 
which a petitioner has been denied standing to chal-
lenge the action of a body before which the petitioner 
had earlier appeared and pressed a claim is Terracor v. 
Utah State Board of Lands and Forestry. 716 P. 2d 796 
(Utah 1986). There, the finding that the petitioner 
lacked standing was based on this Court's conclusion 
that in its petition for a writ, Terracor specifically 
did not seek to overturn the decision of the Land Board 
that was adverse to it, but was only attacking the 
lawfulness of the action of the Board in favor of 
another party. Id. at 798-800. This Court reasoned 
that a resolution of the issues presented would have no 
impact on the decision of the Land Board which was 
adverse to Terracor. 
Phrased in terms appropriate to the instant 
matter, the Terracor petition for a writ was viewed as 
not being appellate in nature; Terracor was simply 
mounting a fresh challenge to the agency's actions. 
Therefore, its standing before this Court was in no way 
advanced by the fact that it had standing before the 
Board of State Lands in an unrelated proceeding below. 
From that perspective, this Court saw Terracor's writ 
petition as nothing but a generalized attack on the 
Board's mode of proceeding, an attack that could have 
been made equally well by anyone. Therefore, Terracor 
couldTHow no adverse interest and was denied standing. 
TcH Had Terracor directly challenged the agency's 
decision adverse to it, there would have been no 
question as to its standing to seek the writ. See id. 
(Emphasis added.) 743 P. 2d at 1172, footnote 7. 
In this case, NPCA is even further removed from the 
_ i i _ 
position in which Terracor sought, and was denied, standing 
before this Court. As set forth in the letter dated November 16, 
1987, from Patrick D. Spurgin, Director of the Division of State 
Lands and Forestry, to counsel for petitioner (R., p. 75), the 
Division of State Lands and Forestry has no procedures under 
which a request for intervention by NPCA in the consideration of 
an exchange proposal might be granted, because consideration of 
an exchange application by the Division is not viewed as an 
adjudicative action under present law. Therefore, NPCA had no 
basis whatsoever for standing in the process of the exchange 
between the State of Utah and Garfield County, particularly where 
that process was expressly sanctioned by Utah Code Annotated 
Section 65-1-70. 
This case is similar in nature to that considered in 
York v. Unqualified Washington County Elected Officials, 714 
P. 2d 679 (Utah 1986), in which this Court found that the plain-
tiff had failed to show that he had any personal stake in the 
controversy he raised, or that he was adversely affected by the 
governmental action. A mere allegation of an adverse impact, 
without more, is insufficient. Plaintiff may not allege jeopardy 
or injury to others in order to confer standing upon his own 
claims. 714 P. 2d at 680; Jenkins v. Swan, supra, 675 P. 2d at 
1150-51. 
In short, in this case, the "Petition for Review" seeks 
to challenge the actions of the State of Utah in making an 
exchange of real property with Garfield County. NPCA has no 
personal stake in the outcome of that transaction. No injury 
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whatsoever has occurred to petitioner. NPCA certainly does not 
have greater interest in the outcome of the case than does 
Garfield County, as the owner of the subject property. This case 
presents no "unique" issue of "great public importance", despite 
NPCAfs characterizations, but, instead, is simply a generalized 
attack on the mode of proceeding which could have been made 
equally well by anyone else. Because there is no adverse impact, 
petitioner is not an aggrieved party, and has no standing before 
this Court, under any test of standing set forth in Utah law. 
NPCA merely seeks to convert this Court into a forum for the 
resolution of a political and ideological dispute over the 
performance of government in the exercise of its statutory 
functions. The "Petition for Review" should be dismissed, with 
prejudice. 
POINT III: THE EXCHANGE IS VALID UNDER UTAH LAW. 
Despite the protracted effort by NPCA in its brief to 
incorporate various theories under federal environmental laws 
into its attack upon the exchange at issue in this case, the fact 
remains that this exchange is valid under Utah law, as expressly 
authorized by former Utah Code Annotated Section 65-1-70. This 
case is not about federal "public trust" lands, nor is it about 
the litigation over the Burr Trail, which has already been 
adjudicated in the federal courts. This case deals with a State 
school section, and is governed by state law. The National Park 
Organic Act does not apply to a State school section; rather, 
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state lands are governed by "multiple use, sustained yield" 
principles, under former Utah Code Annotated Section 65-1-14, now 
codified at Utah Code Annotated Section 65A-2-1. 
NPCA's claims in this case bear a remarkable 
resemblance to those made in Save Our Dunes v. Alabama Dept. of 
Environmental Management, 834 F. 2d 984 (11th Cir. 1987). In 
that case, various environmental organizations challenged 
approval given by the Alabama Department of Environmental 
Management to developers who wished to erect structures in a 
coastal zone. The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit held that the environmental organizations had to 
be "aggrieved" parties under state law, in order to challenge the 
agency action, which did not hinge on their standing status in 
federal court. The Court narrowly defined "aggrieved" persons as 
only those who own land affected by the issuance of a building 
permit, and denied plaintiff's claims, as follows: 
As Alabama land use cases suggest, aesthetic, 
environmental, or recreational concerns alone do not 
confer "aggrieved party" status; the complainantlriust 
show that an adverse agency action somehow affected his 
or her interest in land. 
Tn the present ca¥e plaintiffs consist of various 
civic-minded and environmental organizations, whose 
members may or may not be citizens of Alabama. 
Plaintiffs claim that they use and enjoy Alabama's 
coastal beaches. Yet they have not shown how ADEM's 
actions adversely affected their legal or equitable 
interests in land. Consequently, plaintiffs have not 
established that they are "aggrieved" within the 
meaning of state law. Under the fourteeth amendment, 
plaintiff's1 claim to a constitutionally cognizable 
"property" interest must be grounded in state law. 
Thus, without demonstrating" how they qualify as 
"aggrieved" persons under Alabama law, plaintiffs have 
no property interest in a state appeal tc> support their 
claim to due process. 834 F. 2d at 988-89. (Emphasis 
added.) 
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In this case, NPCA has no property interest whatsoever 
in the land which is the subject of this exchange. That property 
is now owned by Garfield County, in fee simple absolute. 
Petitioner's abstract "aesthetic and recreational" concerns are 
not sufficient to confer upon NPCA the status of an "aggrieved" 
party in this case, under Utah law, such that it has any 
legitimate basis to challenge the exchange between the State of 
Utah and Garfield County. 
In short, the only issue properly before the Court in 
this case, as set forth in Peatross v. Board of Commissioners of 
Salt Lake County, cited above, is simply whether or not the State 
of Utah either acted outside of its authority, or in a manner so 
clearly outside reason that its action must be deemed capricious 
and arbitrary. 555 P. 2d at 284. Under that narrow standard of 
review, on the administrative record before this Court, and in 
view of the specific statutory authorization of Section 65-1-70, 
it is clear that, in approving the subject exchange, the State of 
Utah acted in proper compliance with its trust responsibilities, 
and by its express statutory authority. Therefore, the "Petition 
for Review" is not well taken, and should be dismissed, with 
prejudice. 
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POINT IV: THE VALIDITY OF THE PATENT TO GARFIELD COUNTY SHOULD BE 
UPHELD. 
As evidenced by the Patent issued by the State of Utah to 
Garfield County, a copy of which is included in the Addendum to 
this Brief, Garfield County is now the owner, in fee simple 
absolute, of the real property which is the subject of this 
action. Petitioner seeks to have that conveyance rescinded by 
this Court in its "Petition for Review". 
As the Supreme Court of Oklahoma declared in Easterlinq 
v. Ferris, 651 P. 2d 677 (Okla. 1982) at 682, "The cancellation 
of a deed is an exertion of the most extraordinary power of a 
court of equity. The power ought not to be exercised except in a 
clear and exceptional case." Furthermore, this Court has held 
that, in order to obtain a decree rescinding a written 
conveyance, the facts necessary for the allowance of that remedy 
must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, and not by a 
mere preponderance. Sine v. Harper, 118 Utah 415, 222 P. 2d 571 
(1950) at 580. 
More than a century ago, this Court was asked to decide 
whether a land patent was improperly granted. In Ferry v. 
Street, 4 Utah 521, 7 P. 712 (1885), this Court specifically 
held, "If, under any assumed state of circumstances a patent can 
be valid, then it cannot be attacked in any collateral 
proceeding, or in any manner, except by direct action to set 
aside the deed indicated, either by the United States, or by the 
persons who have succeeded to its right." 7 P. at 713. 
(Emphasis added.) 
On re-hearing, this Court carefully considered the 
validity of the patent in Ferry v. Street, 4 Utah 521, 11 P. 571 
(1886), and held as follows: 
The decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States 
establish the following propositions of law: First. 
That the various acts of Congress mentioned reserving 
portions of the public lands of the United States to 
the territories or states for the benefit of their 
people, vest the title of such lands so reserved in the 
territories or states when the lands are surveyed, or 
when they are bounded and ascertained. Until such time 
the obligation is executory, and the title remains in 
the federal government. Second. If the officers of 
the land department had no authority to issue the 
patent, for the reason that there was no law 
authorizing the sale of the land, or that it had been 
reserved for sale, (being identified,) or that the 
title was not in the United States, the patent is void. 
Third. As to all questions of fact which the land 
department is called upon to consider and pass upon 
before issuing the patent, the judgment of that depart-
ment is unassailable, except in a direct proceeding for 
its afvnulment. Fourth. Among the questions the land 
department is called upon to consider is the character 
of the land, and the class to which it belongs, whether 
agricultural or mineral, and whether it is within a 
town-site. Fifth. IjP the land department had juris-
diction, the law conclusively presumes, Tn a collateral 
proceeding, the existence of: all circumstances essen-
tial to the validity of the~patent. Unless the patent 
is void, in view of the law, or of circumstances which 
the court may take judicial notice of, it must be held 
valid. All other essential circumstances must be 
presumed to have existed. 11 P. at 576. (Emphasis 
added. ) 
The appeal of that case was dismissed by the United 
States Supreme Court in Street v. Ferry, 119 U.S. 385 (1886). 
This principle was applied to a patent of state lands 
in Perry v. McConkie, 1 Utah 2d 189, 264 P. 2d 852 (1953), in 
which this Court held that "an attack on the patent, valid on its 
face, ... is reserved unto the sovereign." 264 P. 2d at 854. 
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(Emphasis added.) Therefore, under Utah law, NPCA has no legal 
basis for a collateral attack upon the Patent in this case. 
The general rule that a patent to land is the highest 
evidence of title, and is immune from collateral attack, prevails 
throughout the Western states. See, e.g., State v. Crawford, 7 
Ariz. App. 551, 441 P. 2d 586 (Ariz. App. 1968); Ashley v. 
Hill, 150 Colo. 563, 375 P. 2d 337 (Colo. 1962); Dredge Corp. v. 
Husite Co., 78 Nev. 69, 369 P. 2d 676 (Nev. 1962); cert, denied, 
371 U.S. 821 (1962); Bustamante v. Sena, 92 N.M. 72, 582 P. 2d 
1285 (N.M. 1978); See generally, 63A Am. Jur. 2d Public Lands, 
Sections 74-76 (1984), pp. 572-574. 
In addition to the fact that, under a century of 
precedent by this Court, NPCA has no legal basis for a collateral 
attack upon the validity of the Patent in this case, theire are 
compelling policy reasons why the validity of the Patent should 
be upheld in this case. The State of Utah, as the holder of 
deeds to the real property which was conveyed to the State by 
Garfield County last year, has undoubtedly received the benefits 
of and profits from the use of those lands, and may well have 
already included those lands in management plans and contractual 
arrangements with third parties, in reliance upon the subject 
exchange. There is no clear and convincing evidence before this 
Court which would warrant the rescission of those conveyances, 
and the violation of any contractual arrangements which may have 
been made in reliance thereon. The "Petition for Review" should 
be dismissed, with prejudice. 
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POINT V: PETITIONER'S BRIEF IMPROPERLY RELIES UPON MATTERS NOT 
OF RECORD IN THIS CASE, 
At the time it filed its opening brief in this case, 
NPCA filed a Motion to Supplement Administrative Record with this 
Court, in which it sought to introduce various affidavits, a 
newspaper article, and other documents into this case. Following 
the submission of memoranda and oral argument, on July 19, 1988, 
this Court denied the Motion to Supplement Administrative Record. 
NPCA's opening brief, in large part, relies upon 
materials with which it had sought to supplement the administra-
tive record in this case, and which have been excluded by this 
Court. Therefore, those portions of the brief which rely upon 
those materials, particularly in the Statement of Facts and 
Jurisdiction portions thereof, should be disregarded by this 
Court. 
In Watkins v. Simonds, 14 Utah 2d 406, 385 P. 2d 154 
(1963), this Court held that it could not consider facts stated 
in the briefs which are absent in the official record, even if 
true. Accord, Chapman v. Chapman, 728 P. 2d 121 (Utah 1986); 
see, Blodgett v. Zions First National Bank, cited above, in which 
the Utah Court of Appeals held that "merely attaching a document 
to an appellate brief does not make the document part of the 
record." 752 P. 2d at 903-904, footnote 1. 
This Court has repeatedly held that it would not 
adjudicate issues which are not supported by the record. See, 
e.g., Wood v. Myrup, 681 P. 2d 1255 (Utah 1984); Combe v. 
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Warren's Family Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 P. 2d 733 (Utah 1984); 
Matter of Estate of Cluff, 587 P. 2d 128 (Utah 1978). 
Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that this Court 
should disregard those portions of NPCA's opening brief which 
rely upon materials which have been excluded by this Court; and 
that this Court should decline to adjudicate those issues raised 
in petitioner's brief which are not included in or supported by 
the administrative record which is before the Court in this case. 
See, Hobbs v. Denver and Rio Grande Western R.R., 677 P. 2d 1128 
(Utah 1984); Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P. 2d 730 
(Utah 1985). 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the "Petition for 
Review" should be dismissed by this Court, with prejudice. 
DATED this 31st day of October, 1988. 
Patrick B. Nolan 
Garfield County Attorney 
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65-1-68 STATE LANDS 
65-1-68. Subdivision of state lands into lots — Appraisal 
and sale. 
Any portion of the public lands of this state not occupied by bona fide 
settlers having preference right of purchase, may be subdivided into lots, and 
sold as provided in this chapter, the board first being satisfied that by a 
subdivision of any tract into lots a sale of the same can be made for a greater 
amount than if sold in legal subdivisions. The board may survey such tracts 
and direct their subdivision. A plat of the survey shall be filed in the office of 
the county recorder of the county wherein the land is situated, and a copy in 
the office of the board. Tracts so subdivided shall not be subject to lease, but 
each lot shall be sold at public auction at such times as the board may direct. 
The manner of appraisement and sale of such subdivided lands shall be in all 
respects the same as in the case of other lands sold. 
History: L. 1899, ch. 64, § 36; C.L. 1907, Cross-References. — Appraisal and sale of 
§ 2358; C.L. 1917, § 5610; L. 1921, ch. 118, state lands, §§ 65-1-26 and 65-1-29. 
§ 1; 1925, ch. 31, § 1; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, County recorder, Chapter 21 of Title 17. 
86-1-53. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Mandamus. mus. Miles v. Wells, 22 Utah 55, 61 P. 534 
The discretion vested in the board by this (1900), followed, Hamblin v. State Bd. of Land 
section will not be interfered with by manda- Comm'rs, 55 Utah 402, 187 P. 178 (1919). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 73B C.J.S. Public Lands § 178. 
Key Numbers. — Public Lands <s=> 181. 
65-1-69. Method of accounting by state auditor. 
The state auditor shall charge the board with the amount of money, rental, 
interest and principal, separately received from the sale of lease of lands, as 
shown by the duplicate receipts of the state treasurer; and upon presentation 
of the state treasurer's duplicate receipt shall credit the board with the 
amount of the same. 
History: L. 1899, ch. 64, § 37; C.L. 1907, Cross-References. — Functions and duties 
§ 2359; C.L. 1917, § 5611; L. 1921, ch. 118, of state auditor, § 67-3-1. 
§ 1; 1925, ch. 31, § 1; R.S. 1933, & C. 1943, General duties of state treasurer, § 67-4-1. 
86-1-54. 
65-1-70. Exchange of lands between division and propri-
etors — Existing leases. 
In order to compact, as far as practicable, the land holdings of the state, the 
Division of State Lands is hereby authorized to exchange any of the land held 
by the state for other land of equal value within the state held by other 
proprietors; and upon request of the division, the governor is hereby autho-
rized to execute and deliver the necessary patents to such other proprietors 
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and receive therefrom proper deeds of the lands so exchanged; provided, that 
no exchange shall be made by the division until a patent for the land so 
received in exchange shall have been issued to such proprietors of [or] their 
grantors. 
Where the state lands are encumbered by an existing lease, the division, 
upon approval of an exchange, may with the consent of the lessee terminate 
the existing lease and issue a lease of the same type, without regard to provi-
sions of § 65-1-45, on lands of comparable acreage or value which may be 
acquired in the same exchange in which the leased lands are used as base. 
Upon acceptance of exchanged lands, the state shall honor all vested rights. 
History: L. 1899, ch. 64, § 43; C.L. 1907, Amendment Notes. — The 1983 amend-
§ 2365; C.L. 1917, § 5618; L. 1921, ch. 118, ment added the last sentence of the second 
§ 1; 1925, ch. 31, § 1; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, paragraph. 
86-1-58; L. 1973, ch. 180, § 1; 1983, ch. 324, Cross-References. — Patents, § 65-1-43. 
§ 5. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 73B C.J.S. Public Lands § 178. 
Key Numbers. — Public Lands «= 181. 
65-1-71. Board members and employees — May not ac-
quire state lands. 
The members of the State Land Board and its employees are hereby prohib-
ited from acquiring, either directly or indirectly, any state lands or interest 
therein; provided, that the provisions hereof shall not interfere with any ap-
plication or any contract to purchase any state lands or with any renewal of 
any lease made prior to March 6, 1925. 
History: L. 1907, ch. 164, § 2; C.L. 1907, section, were transferred to the Board of State 
§ 2369x3; C.L. 1917, § 5624; L. 1921, ch. 118, Lands. See § 66-1-1. 
§ 1; 1925, ch. 31, § 1; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, Cross-References. — Ethics Act, conflict of 
86-1-59. interests prohibited, § 67-16-9. 
Compiler's Notes. — The powers and duties Official misconduct an offense, § 76-8-201, 
of the State Land Board, referred to in this 76-8-202. 
65-1-72. Interference with application to acquire state 
lands. 
Any member of the board, or any employee thereof, who, either directly or 
indirectly, in his own interest, or in the interest of another, interferes with or 
hinders the application of a bona fide applicant to acquire state lands or any 
interest therein is guilty of a misdemeanor. 
History: L. 1907, ch. 164, § 3; C.L. 1907, Cross-References. — Sentencing for misde-
§ 2369x4; C.L. 1917, § 5625; L. 1921, ch. 118, meanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
§ 1; 1925, ch. 31, § 1; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
86-1-60. 
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EXHIRLX-l'A" 
Certificate 
JNTY OF GARFIELD ) 
) SS 
iTE OF UTAH ) 
I, MAMIE D. HATCH duly elected, qualified and acting County Recorder in and 
Garfield County, State of Utah, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of 
PATENT recorded (of filed) 29th day of DECEMBER 19 87 
now of record in my office, Book 295 Page 587 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the 
order, at the city of Panguitch, Utah, this 12th day of FEBRUARY 19 88 
GAkFIELD COUNTY RECORDER 
199161 
EXCHANGE NO. 188 « REQUEST Of / l \ i,J(, 
N o . A 8 S . 7 l «CO»0EH SAAHKO CCUSTY. UTAH 
tEa <M to Jffifymi tftfjm presents jsljall Come fectmg: 
WHEREAS, rrnrrr.JA?/IM^ UTAH 
~ ^ ~ " — • PANGUITCH • 
oew. 
of the County of tim.mim:n.:.K...QARQS)r.P...:..........^  i ... ...:.... SUte of ^nrr:.,yiM»?:...,:.:.:.r..../heretofore purchased from 
the SUte of Utah, the lands hereinafter described, pursuant to the laws of said State in such case made and provided, 
AND WHEREAS, the said JMBEJELD.XQUO^^ 
kutt . paid for said lands, pursuant to the conditions of said sale, and the laws of the State duly enacted in relation thereto, the 
sum of ...:....:.... I.;..;:..::.:.::.....-.....: ^ ! ! M . j . . : . . i ^ : , : t , u ^ : : . . . : : , , : z z . . . : t . - . . , : : . M . : . : : ;.„:...:.:....DotlsLrs, 
and all legal interest thereon accrued, as fully appears by the certificate of the proper officer, now on file in the office of the Secretary 
of SUte of the State of UUh; 
NOW THEREFORE, I * n n = s s ^ M ^ O ^ . J A N 6 6 B . U B ~ :v.r, Governor, in consideration of the premises, 
and by virtue of the power and authority vested in me by the laws of the SUte of Utah, in such case made and provided, do issue 
this PATENT, in the name and by the authority of the SUte of UUh, hereby granting and confirming unto the said 
^ o a ^ ^ fiABEJJELP..^^ , s...r..r..r 
'^..T...T.:".?~:..T..::r.'r...r^^ to^sif.-.w....'; ....».....v.7rr.nr.?>r.r.-r.:>r.r.T.-^ rr.?r... heirs and assigns 
forever, the following tract or parcel of land, situated in the County of V.~:.r.r...:r.......^ SUte sforesaid, 
to-wit: A!X.P.L5.SSM9fl^ 
Base and Meridian. ~ — — . —. — 
IN EXCHANGE FOR: — 
Northwest Quarter (NWi) (except that portion contained in the NVfc airport runway). North Half 
(SV) oT''the"'Sou^ 
l5)i.West..Half..^ 
ranKMk.]tarJto 
~Jh.fcttssJx..^ :...:...-
NprU\east.9uarter 
gSKBSr 
conUining-
</ 
